At the South China Sea sub-forum of the 2026 Boao Forum for Asia, one topic kept resurfacing during exchanges with delegates on the theme "Rules and Order in the South China Sea — Reflections and Pathways: the situation in the Strait of Hormuz". The ripple effects of disrupted navigation there naturally prompt outsiders to wonder what might happen in the South China Sea, another critical sea lane.

Yet the two waterways are fundamentally different. For years, freedom and safety of navigation in the South China Sea have remained fully assured; disputes have never materially disrupted commercial traffic. That said, shifts in the external environment — especially heightened anxiety over energy security — do exert subtle pressure on the readiness of littoral states to cooperate.

High oil prices could encourage parties to revisit the wisdom of shelving disputes and pursuing joint development; recent signals from Manila are worth watching. At the same time, they might tempt certain actors to test the waters with unilateral moves. Past experience shows such probes will meet firm Chinese countermeasures in defense of sovereign rights.

These exchanges have led the author, as an international law scholar, to reflect on a core truth: peace and stability in the South China Sea are not a given. They require both a favorable external climate and sustained wisdom and restraint from the countries around it. Against that backdrop, several observations on the South China Sea question may be in order.

For more than two decades, what has been the dominant trend in the South China Sea — conflict and confrontation, or peace and stability? The answer is unequivocally the latter. The disputes date back to the 1960s and 1970s and encompass both territorial claims over islands and reefs and maritime boundary issues.

From a legal standpoint, they constitute one of the world's most complex hybrid disputes. Even so, navigational safety and freedom have never been compromised. China and the ASEAN states are all beneficiaries of this tranquility; normal commercial shipping has continued uninterrupted by the sovereignty quarrel.

In an era when other regions have seen frequent outbreaks of conflict, the relative calm of the South China Sea appears all the more valuable.

Why has this been possible? Among many factors, the most important lesson is the comprehensive, full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

When parties adhere faithfully to the DOC framework, differences shrink, frictions diminish and cooperation expands. Regrettably, many outside observers still undervalue this political document. Attention is almost exclusively fixed on the prospective Code of Conduct, as though only a legally binding instrument could solve the problem — an understandable but ultimately misplaced expectation.

International law in the South China Sea cannot be reduced to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) alone. A complete legal perspective is essential. Both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan possess extensive, well-preserved historical archives documenting Japan's wartime occupation of China's South China Sea islands and reefs and China's post-war recovery of them.

These materials reveal a fundamental point: any resolution must be grounded in the post-war international order established by the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the UN Charter, as well as in general and customary international law on territorial questions.

UNCLOS is the cornerstone of modern oceans law and its authority is unquestioned. Yet the Convention itself expressly states that "matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law." It is therefore neither legally accurate nor practically helpful to try to confine the entire South China Sea issue within the four corners of UNCLOS.

The so called South China Sea arbitral award made in 2016 merits result-oriented reflection. The author will not rehearse the respective positions of China and the Philippines, nor dissect the award's jurisdictional, interpretive and factual shortcomings.

The pertinent question is whether the ruling has produced any net positive outcome. Has the South China Sea question become simpler or more complex? Have Sino-Philippine tensions eased or intensified? Objectively, the award has added yet another layer of contention: the very legitimacy and validity of the ruling itself.

Before 2016 the dispute was, as a matter of legal fact, about territory and maritime delimitation; now it also encompasses the status of the award. Equating the arbitration with "the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law" does not strengthen but rather undermines the international legal order. International judicial bodies exist to settle disputes, not to perpetuate them. Why the South China Sea award could not — and indeed could not — fulfil that purpose deserves serious analysis rather than reflexive criticism of China.

The COC represents ASEAN's last realistic chance, and all sides should approach it with measured expectations. In essence, it is a crisis-management mechanism designed to prevent escalation while sovereignty and boundary issues remain unresolved and to create a framework for practical, low-sensitivity maritime cooperation.

Recent acceleration in the talks owes less to any particular ASEAN chair than to the shared desire of China and ASEAN to reach agreement. For years certain parties attempted to insert references to the arbitral award into the text; they now appear to be dropping that unrealistic demand, recognizing that this window of opportunity may not reopen. Frankly, if the littoral states were dealing with any other major power, the outcome might look very different.

Expectations for the COC should therefore be realistic. As an evolution of the DOC, it will serve a useful purpose, yet it is no magic bullet. Future frictions at sea cannot be ruled out; differences over interpretation and application may still arise. Should the COC miss its original timetable, phased outcomes remain possible, but responsibility cannot be laid at any single door.

On the question of legal binding force, China's position is open: it will depend on consensus among the parties. The frequent claim in some international media and academic circles that China opposes a binding code is simply inaccurate.

The turbulence in the Strait of Hormuz reminds us that South China Sea peace and stability are the hard-won product of years of collective effort by the littoral states and must be cherished. As China's Special Envoy for Climate Change and former vice-foreign minister Liu Zhenmin remarked at the forum, the pressure generated by external changes can be converted into momentum.

Accelerating the energy transition across East Asia and building a new regional energy architecture that supports autonomy and security may be the most forward-looking path for all parties to consider today.

The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.