Small chance of a big war

Iran's actual capacity to engage in warfare is weaker than its outwardly proclaimed combat determination. Both the political sphere and the people in Iran understand that seeking national development is still the country's top priority, and escalating war would severely drain Iran's resources, impairing its ability to address domestic issues.

Since the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation launched by Hamas in October 2023, Iran has positioned itself at the forefront of supporting the just cause of Palestine. This strategy has helped Iran gain a more objective and positive national image and reputation in the Arab world, creating strategic opportunities for Iran's development. Escalating the conflict would disrupt this favorable situation.

Recently, neighboring countries of Iran, such as Kuwait, have stated they will not allow their territory and airspace to be used for attacks on Iran, thus limiting the possibility of US and allied attacks on Iran through bases in these neighboring countries.

The desire for security in the Middle East from major Arab nations surpasses military support for the Palestinian people, let alone military support for Iran. Since the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, the interaction between the two countries has been increasing, including joint military exercises and a rise in mutual trust. However, strategic trust does not equate to alliance relationships, as the former does not entail an obligation to deploy troops in case of an attack. The "intimate comrades" fighting alongside Iran are only members of the "axis of resistance".

Israel claims to be facing a "seven-front war", but non-state armed military forces within the "axis of resistance" are insufficient to counter Israel's sustained military attacks, let alone engage in a full-scale war.

Following two rounds of Israel's precise strikes on Iranian military targets, Iran, out of the need to uphold its national prestige, should retaliate but will exercise restraint, avoiding an escalation to direct confrontation between the two countries. Amid the chaos, Iran and Israel have reached a subtle understanding: as long as oil and nuclear facilities are not targeted, the crisis remains manageable for all parties.

On the US front, regardless of which party wins the presidential election, US national interests are closely tied to Israel, and US unilateral support for Israel's Middle East policies will not change. Simultaneously, a broadening of the conflict does not align with US desires. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's recent visit to the Middle East reaffirms that the US values facilitating a ceasefire and prioritizes avoiding an escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran.

When energy-producing nations are embroiled in conflict, it sends unsettling signals to energy markets. If one day Israel's retaliatory actions target Iran's energy facilities, it could potentially trigger a full-scale war between Iran and Israel and severely disrupt the oil market.

Zhang Yuan is a professor at the Middle East Research Institute, Shanghai International Studies University.

The views don't necessarily represent those of China Daily.

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