A war in the Asia-Pacific region seemed impossible 10 years ago. It still seemed improbable when the geopolitical situation deteriorated and tensions mounted five years ago. Last year, however, the fear of a war in the Asia-Pacific gained greater credence. Indeed, on the basis of current trends and choices made, some form of military conflict seems possible. In Japan's case, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has fueled such speculation by visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which honors 14 Class-A and hundreds of other war criminals. In China's case, it declared an Air Defense Identification Zone that covers the disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Besides, Japan's prime minister is not on speaking terms with his counterparts in China and the Republic of Korea. Trends, however, can be reversed depending on the choices made. In his speech at Davos, Abe chose to compare today's China with pre-1914 Germany. Apart from being highly provocative, the analogy is misleading. In reality, it is more complex, though just as alarming. In late 2006, China Central Television telecast a remarkable series, The Rise of the Great Powers (Da Guo Jue Qi). Its haunting main theme was that, from the 15th to the 20th century, every single great power — Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia/Soviet Union and the United States — rose through war, colonization, exploitation and the occasional massacre.

One example is the massacre of American Indians in the US' pursuit of “manifest destiny”. Troublingly, the big speeches aside, when the going has got really tough, the historical evidence points in an uncomfortable direction: When there are choices to be made between war and peace, the default position often seems to be the former. The evidence is overwhelming. Take Britain in the early part of the last century, when “pax” Britannica was at its height. In 1900-01, the country participated in the brutal suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China. From 1899 to 1902, it fought the (Second) Boer War in South Africa during which it incarcerated women and children in concentration camps. In 1904, it invaded Tibet. In 1919, there was the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar, India.

Non-violent Indian protesters were indiscriminately shot by British colonial troops. Will China choose differently? China, historically a great power, was reduced to misery and chaos, and became a pawn on the geopolitical chessboard of the great powers in the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. In the course of the last two decades, China has been rising again to become a global power. Can it break the aggressive trend set by all previous rising great powers? In September 2005, scholar and influential reformer Zheng Bijian published in Foreign Affairs an article entitled, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status”. He put forward various arguments why China would be different and would rise through peace, not war. His principal argument was that, because China is still poor (on a per capita basis), it needs peace to provide prosperity to its people.

There is no reason a priori why China's rise should inevitably result in war. Nor, however, is there any reason a priori why it should not. The outcome will ultimately depend on the choices made, not just in Beijing, but also in Tokyo, Seoul, Washington, Moscow and New Delhi. The choices that Japan has been making recently cause the most concern. Japan has chosen to be insensitive (in respect to atrocities committed) and provocative vis-à-vis China and the ROK.