Trump will need to recognize that the geopolitical landscape has changed since his first administration

On Jan 20, Donald Trump will take office at a time of global volatility unparalleled since the Cold War era. As the world speculates on how his second term might shape US foreign policy, one question looms large: how will US-China relations be in Trump's second term? Will Trump sustain the confrontational approach that defined his first term, or pivot toward recalibration? To understand what lies ahead, it is essential to consider three dominant perspectives on Trump's foreign policy, each with its own merit: his "transactional leadership" style, the "Jacksonian" tradition shaping his foreign policy doctrine, and the institutional dynamics that have fostered a bipartisan consensus on China — all within the context of China's evolving strengths in economic, technological, military and diplomatic realms.

A common perspective holds that Trump's leadership style is "transactional" to its core. He thrives on short-term, measurable gains, often at the expense of long-term strategy or alliances. Trump's transactionalism, which defined his first term, prioritizes deal-making over coherent policymaking and ideological commitments, leveraging unpredictability as a negotiation tool.

In his dealings with China, Trump has alternated between combative rhetoric and unexpected praise. This seemingly erratic behavior appears to be a transactional strategy aimed at keeping opponents off balance and maximizing leverage. Trump's approach, which involves elements of "high anchoring" and "brinkmanship "strategies, is exemplified by his proposed 60 percent tariffs on Chinese goods, a tactic that involves setting extreme demands to push the boundaries of what is considered negotiable. Trump's unpredictability, such as his dramatic shift on TikTok from proposing a ban to opposing restrictions, reflects his tendency to use issues as bargaining chips. Similarly, his threats to "retake" the Panama Canal illustrate a willingness to escalate disputes for short-term advantage, often blurring the line between negotiation and provocation.

From an ideational perspective, Trump's approach is often associated with the Jacksonian tradition of US foreign policy. By invoking Andrew Jackson — the seventh US president remembered as a racist slaver and genocidal tyrant with Napoleonic aspirations — as his political hero, Trump aligns himself with a lineage that views free trade, international cooperation, and multilateral agreements as constraints on US autonomy.

Interestingly, Trump's focus on acquiring territories such as Panama and Greenland echoes Jackson's expansionist approach. Jackson sought territorial gains through purchase and, when thwarted, covertly supported settlers, fueling a proxy war in Texas. Jackson's administration also used naval force in Sumatra to assert US power and secure US interests, a strategy mirrored in Trump's nationalist ambitions.

Trump's Jacksonian populism appears to have driven his decisions to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. It also informed his criticism of NATO as "obsolete" and his rejection of NAFTA in favor of bilateral deals. Trump's populist rhetoric about China — labeling it a "thief" of US intellectual property — further underscores this Jacksonian ethos. Under the Trump doctrine, moreover, the National Security Strategy shifted from counterterrorism to long-term rivalry with so-called revisionist powers, particularly China. This framework justified the trade war, which resulted in tariffs on Chinese goods and restrictions on technology companies such as Huawei.

Trump's disruptive style and alignment with a crude nationalist tradition aside, his policies toward China align with a broader institutional consensus that has emerged during the 2010s. Long before Trump's first presidency, US political elites began viewing China's peaceful rise as a strategic threat. The Barack Obama administration's pivot to Asia marked the beginning of this shift, which Trump expanded upon, and Joe Biden has reinforced.

Trump's free and open "Indo-Pacific" strategy, unveiled in 2017, built on Obama's regional focus, reviving alliances such as the Quad and promoting "Freedom of Navigation" operations in the South China Sea. His administration passed the BUILD Act, creating the US International Development Finance Corporation to challenge China's Belt and Road Initiative. Trump's policy on the Taiwan region also became a cornerstone of his China strategy. His administration normalized arms sales to Taiwan island, and passed the Taiwan Travel Act, fostering high-level diplomatic exchanges. Biden has expanded many of these initiatives, expanding the US tariffs and sanctions on China, introducing the "Indo-Pacific" Economic Framework for Prosperity, initiating the "Chip 4 Alliance" and forging the AUKUS security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom. Therefore, the past three administrations reflect a bipartisan consensus that China is the US' principal geopolitical challenge, ensuring continuity in US-China rivalry regardless of Trump's leadership style.

Finally, Trump's Cabinet picks and campaign donors suggest continuity in his hard-line stance on China, which strongly reflects this bipartisan consensus. Key donors, such as Timothy Mellon, who praised Trump's trade efforts, and Robert Bigelow, advocating for US dominance in space exploration, align with his nationalist agenda. Elon Musk presents a more nuanced case; while opposing US tariffs and maintaining business ties in China, rising tensions over China's efforts to reduce reliance on Tesla and Starlink could push Musk closer to Trump's policies.

Trump's Cabinet selections further reflect an aggressive stance. Marco Rubio, J.D. Vance and Mike Waltz are among the staunchest critics of China, advocating for measures such as banning Chinese telecom equipments, bolstering Taiwan island's military capabilities, and enhancing US military readiness in the "Indo-Pacific" region. Elise Stefanik previously targeted Chinese influence in elections and academia, while Pete Hegseth and John Ratcliffe focused on countering China's development efforts.

Despite this bipartisan consensus, the US faces a transformed geopolitical landscape compared to Trump's first term, as China has significantly bolstered its global position. Economically, China has achieved significant progress in strategic industries such as manufacturing, green technology and artificial intelligence, while the BRI continues to expand its influence in Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. Militarily, advancements in hypersonic weapons, naval and aerial capabilities, and cyber technologies enhance China's ability to counter US expansionism. Diplomatically, China has diversified its multilateral engagement and alliances with nations such as Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, challenging US containment efforts. Therefore, a hawkish approach alone may be insufficient without a nuanced understanding of China's evolving strengths.

Trump's return to the presidency is likely to deepen the US strategic rivalry with China, but the dynamics of this confrontation have shifted significantly. China's remarkable progress in economic, technological, military and diplomatic spheres ensures that it is not merely a passive player but an active agent in global power realignments. While institutional and ideational dimensions of US policy point to continuity in countering China's peaceful development, Trump's unpredictable and transactional style introduces an element of volatility that Beijing is well-prepared to manage. Ultimately, the impact of Trump's second term will depend not only on how he balances these dimensions of his foreign policy but also on how China leverages its strengths. This chapter in US-China relations may redefine the contours of global power in an increasingly multipolar world.

The author is an adjunct professor at Shanghai University and visiting senior fellow at the London School of Economics. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.